We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as "at peace", we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows us to isolate factors that contribute to conflict origination (onset of incompatibilities) and factors that promote conflict militarization (onset of armed violence). Using new data on incompatibilities and armed conflict, we replicate and extend three prior studies of violent civil conflict, reformulated as a two-stage process, considering a number of different estimation procedures and potential selection problems. We find that the group-based horizontal political inequalities highlighted in research on violent civil conflict clearly influence conflict origination but have no clear effect on militarization, whereas other features emphasized as shaping the risk of civil war, such as refugee flows and soft state power, strongly influence militarization but not incompatibilities. We posit that a two-stage approach to conflict analysis can help advance theories of civil conflict, assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables are thought to influence conflict, and guide new data collection efforts.
2 origination rather than violence as a specific means. The conventional approach-comparing countries with and without armed conflict-does not allow us to assess this claim, as the absence of armed conflict does not imply the absence of incompatibilities.
Furthermore, restricting civil conflict to armed violence hinders the assessment of alternative mechanisms relating specific variables to conflict. Consider the role of low GDP per capita:
5 Does it increase the risk of armed conflict because it generates incompatibilities (e.g., through poverty-related grievances) or because it facilitates rebel recruitment for armed violence (e.g., due to lower opportunity costs)? To discriminate between these claims, we must distinguish between conflict origination and conflict militarization.
This study demonstrates how the two conflict stages can be conceptually and empirically defined. In contrast to previous research that has lumped together all non-armed conflicts and the absence of manifest conflict into a compound "peace" category, we distinguish between three distinct states: "no contested incompatibility", "contested incompatibility", and "armed conflict".
This allows us to isolate contested incompatibilities (that may or may not see violence) and armed conflicts over incompatibilities. This, in turn, allows us to assess factors that account for conflict origination and others that account for conflict militarization.
We first discuss existing conceptualizations of civil conflict and present a framework that disaggregates the dichotomy of peace/armed conflict into the three distinct states. We then introduce data that allow us to identify conflict origination separately from conflict militarization and present our two-stage estimation strategy. Subsequently, we demonstrate the value of the two-stage approach by replicating three studies of violent civil conflict. We start by replicating a study of horizontal inequalities and motivation for conflict, which we expect should yield clearer effects on incompatibilities than armed conflicts. 6 We then replicate two other studies that illustrate factors that make armed conflicts more likely conditional on incompatibilities rather than affecting the emergence of incompatibilities. 7 Our analyses show how findings in previous research on civil war pertain to particular conflict stages and provide new theoretical insights into the likely mechanisms. Based on these findings, we conclude that a two-stage approach can help advance theories of civil conflict, help assess alternative mechanisms through which variables are theorized to influence conflicts, and guide new data collection.
Research on Civil Conflict
Previous research has shown that various demographic, economic, institutional, and geographic factors correlate cross-nationally with the onset of civil conflict. 8 However, we know less about how these factors influence different conflict stages. With some recent exceptions, 9 studies of civil conflict have traditionally focused on armed categories, ignoring non-armed incompatibilities or relegating them to a compound category of "peace", defined only by the absence of organized violence.
Many scholars of interstate conflict have long highlighted the importance of distinguishing between separate stages such as the onset of disputes or rivalries and escalation to war. 10 Some studies have found that key factors linked to international wars have distinct effects 4 on different conflict stages. For example, Reed found that satisfaction with the status quo and joint democracy reduce the likelihood of a dispute in a dyad but do not affect the likelihood of the dispute escalating to war, while power parity has effects with opposite signs in the two stages. 11 These findings provide important insights into the mechanisms affecting crises and escalation to international wars. For example, the "democratic peace" appears to arise from a lower likelihood of disputes between democracies rather than institutional constraints that prevent the use of large-scale violence against other democratic states in disputes.
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Given the recognition of two-stage approaches in international relations research, it is striking that similar approaches have not been applied to the study of civil conflict. The emphasis on violence in civil conflict research stems in part from the lack of data on domestic equivalents of interstate disputes. Interstate disputes are easy to identify through overt claims or threats sanctioned by governments. 13 By contrast, domestic incompatibilities may not be publically expressed due to fears of government sanctions. Delineating parties to an incompatibility is also difficult, as potential actors such as ethnic groups often lack cohesion and collective organization prior to large-scale mobilization, and many groups opposing governments are not ethnic.
6
We can then define armed civil conflict as an incompatibility involving the systematic use of armed force. "Systematic" implies organized and sustained over an extended period. Nonarmed incompatibility and armed conflict are thus both instances of civil incompatibility/conflict but distinguished by the presence/absence of the systematic use of armed force.
The "no incompatibly"/incompatibility distinction is more difficult to evaluate and requires actual data on evidence of claims as well as criteria for determining them. The criteria introduced above arguably allow for overcoming these difficulties. Criterion a ensures that incompatibilities are publicly displayed, with contestants actively pursuing their objectives.
Hence, the mere presence of potentially contentious issues such as inequality does not by itself constitute an incompatibility unless the relevant actors mobilize and articulate specific claims.
Criterion b establishes that incompatibilities threaten either the government or the core integrity of a state. Criteria c and d ensure that incompatibilities only include conflicts between state governments and other clearly defined political actors, thereby excluding non-state conflicts and incompatibilities between non-politically organized actors, such as criminal enterprises. Finally, criterion f excludes routine, legal political processes that are typically considered distinct from incompatibilities leading to armed conflict. Using these concepts, we thus redefine the outbreak of civil conflict as the end result of a two-stage process that generates the three above-mentioned states.
Measuring Contested Incompatibilities and Armed Conflict
Two-stage analysis requires data to identify the onset of incompatibilities separately from the onset of armed conflict. Five indicators distinguish between violent crises, limited wars, and wars: (1) type of weapon and how it was used; (2) personnel involved; (3) casualties/deaths; (4) damage to infrastructure, accommodation, the economy, and culture; (5) cross-border refugees and internally displaced persons. The CONIAS conflict observers give each indicator a score, which are aggregated into the conflict intensity levels (Table 1) . We provide a more elaborate discussion of the CONIAS definitions in the Online Appendix (OA).
[ 29 Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016. 30 Sambanis 2004 . 31 Chenoweth and Lewis 2013. We also considered comparing CONIAS to self-determination disputes or social conflict events from the SCAD dataset; see Salehyan et al. 2012 . However, the former includes only the sub-set of territorial incompatibilities, and the latter includes many events that do not fall under our definition of incompatibility (e.g., labor union strikes, conflicts between non-state actors).
Finally, we scrutinized the coding of 10 randomly selected CONIAS conflicts and evaluated the assigned values against case study evidence. While the coding of start and end dates of some conflicts could be contested, overall, the data closely matched the record in the cases.
Two-Stage Estimation Strategy
Two-stage models highlight potential selection issues, as factors that determine outcomes in the first stage may also affect conclusions about impacts in the second stage. 32 In the classical application, Heckman noted the selection problem in assessing how factors such as education affected women's wages, since many women would not enter the labor market unless they anticipated sufficiently high wages, and expectations about wages could be influenced in part by factors correlated to the feature of interest.
In a two-stage process, we may have selection on observable or non-observable characteristics. If observable, then factors affecting selection in the first stage that also influence the second stage can in principle be modeled explicitly so that the errors in the two equations will be uncorrelated. In this case, selection can easily be modeled using a so-called two-part potential militarization is arguably undefined rather than a missing value. Moreover, the 2PM has less strict identification requirements and makes it easier to test all factors, both at the incompatibility and militarization stages.
If there is selection on unobservables, so that unmeasured factors that influence selection also affect the outcome, the observed regressors that influence selection in the first stage will not suffice to remove residual correlation between the errors in the first and second stages. The
Heckman selection model considers how unobserved factors in the first stage may be correlated with unobserved factors influencing second-stage outcomes by adding the "selection hazard" or inverse Mills' ratio to the second stage to address omitted variable bias. 36 Bivariate selection models are theoretically identified without restrictions on the regressors. However, if the exact same regressors are used in the two stages, then the model is identified only through assumptions about the distribution of the residuals. 37 Sample selection models tend to work better when one can introduce plausible instruments that determine the first-stage selection but not the secondstage outcome. We argue that total population size meets both of these criteria.
Validating population size as appropriate instrument
The validity of an instrument in our two-stage estimation pertains to two concerns: (i) whether the instrument is relevant for Stage 1 or onset of incompatibilities and (ii) whether it only influences Stage 2 or militarization through its effect on the Stage 1 but has no independent effect (exclusion restriction). 36 Heckman 1979.
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Population size satisfies the relevance criterion with little controversy: if individuals differ in their preferences and differences in preferences or policy views at least sometimes lead to manifest incompatibilities, then the likelihood of incompatibilities will increase with the number of individuals in a population. A larger population is likely to have more heterogeneous preferences (towards ideology, the structure of political institutions, group autonomy, language policies, taxes, etc.) than a small population. This is consistent with the empirical observation that large countries like India or Indonesia have more manifest incompatibilities than small countries like Tuvalu or Liechtenstein.
Many scholars interpret the population size-conflict relationship as reflecting preference heterogeneity, arguing that "grievances…increase with size: public choices diverge more from the preferences of the average individual as heterogeneity increases" 38 . Outside conflict research, a long tradition of studies also relates increasing diversity and cleavages to population size. Dahl and Tufte argued that small countries tend to be more homogenous and that increasing size brings diversity and conflict, as "persistent and overt differences in political outlooks, interests, and demands are likely to appear" 39 . According to Alesina, as countries become larger, the diversity of preferences, culture, language, "identity" of their population increases…Being part of the same country implies agreeing on a set of policies: from redistributive schemes, to public goods to foreign policy; as heterogeneity increases, more and more diverse individuals will have to agree…and individuals or regions will be less satisfied by the central government policies.
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In the civil war literature, population size is typically introduced as a control variable, with little elaboration of mechanisms. Many state that civil war is more likely with a higher population without specifying whether population size affects the likelihood of initial incompatibilities or prospects for violence. 41 We see no reason why population size by itself should predict to violence, over and beyond the influence on the likelihood of incompatibilities.
However, given that population size plays a prominent role in civil war research, one might worry whether it has some direct influence on opportunities for violence, violating the exclusion criterion.
Studies comparing violent and non-violent tactics provide no support for a relationship between population size and violence. 42 However, since an exclusion criterion is primarily a theoretical issue, and generally cannot be evaluated empirically, we performed a comprehensive literature search to identify all studies with population size as a predictor and the suggested mechanisms linking population to civil war onset. Searching ISI Web of Science with the key words "Civil War" AND "Population" within "Political Science" and "International Relations" returned 222 studies. Of these, 32 focus on civil conflict onset and include population size (or other population characteristics such as density) among covariates. We then identified all arguments explicitly addressing the population-conflict link. We refer to OA (83-117) for an extended discussion but comment briefly here on why we see mechanisms highlighting 40 Alesina 2003, 304-5. incompatibilities as the most relevant, and why alternative arguments fail to substantiate a plausible direct link from population size to violence.
Most studies specifying a mechanism for the population-conflict link focus on population density, geographic dispersion, or growth rather than size. Arguments focusing on opportunities for violence actually highlight how low population density contributes to making peripheral areas inaccessible to the state and more prone to conflict. 43 Although countries with large populations could have wider population dispersion, the Collier and Hoeffler replication data show only a modest correlation between the two.
Among the many studies that examine the population-civil war link, it is possible to find arguments relating population to militarization, either in addition to the effects on heterogeneity or incompatibilities, or through a direct impact on opportunities for violence with no role for incompatibilities. Below, we briefly discuss why we find these arguments unpersuasive (see OA for details).
Collier and Hoeffler argue that larger populations can increase recruitment through lower labor costs for rebels. This seems implausible, as larger populations and more densely populated areas tend to have higher wages. It is also unclear why lower wages would not increase government recruitment more than rebel recruitment. Larger states, subsequently, would generally require a proportionally larger force, and larger firms tend to pay higher wages.
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In a study associated with the dismissal of grievance's role in civil conflict, Fearon and Finally, we can easily demonstrate that if we simulate random data for a two-stage process in line with our two stage set up, then we will find a direct effect in a separate regression in Stage 2 if we introduce a non-trivial direct effect for a postulated instrument to violate the exclusion restriction (OA, 113-7). The universality of this result should not be overstated and may not extend to an unknown data generating process. However, we think that the burden of proof should rest on skeptics to explain how a non-trival direct effect of population size on militarization over and beyond the effect through incompatibilities would not be detectable in the observed data.
Exploring the two-stage approach
To assess the plausibility of our proposed instrument and examine the various aspects of the twostage estimation, we first replicate a study by Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch. 50 This study extends prior work on how horizontal inequalities increase the risk of civil war through the potential motivation of actors, 51 showing how the group-specific insights from previous work 49 Gates 2002. can be scaled to the country level. This is an ideal example for us, given the current prominence of research on horizontal inequalities and since we can easily extend the original setup to consider how these factors influence incompatibilities and violence, respectively. The original model includes a number of horizontal inequality measures. For conciseness, however, we only focus here on their key measure of horizontal political inequality, given by the population share of the largest ethnic group subject to active discrimination (LDG). cannot be tested empirically, we find that adding population size at Stage 2 yields a negative and not significant coefficient on militarization, conditional on incompatibilities. This is consistent with our expectation that the entire effect on violent conflict runs through the initial incompatibilities and inconsistent with most arguments that imply a direct effect on violence.
The estimate for the correlation between the residuals ρ is modest and insignificant, and the Wald test provides no evidence for rejecting the null of no correlation. One possible interpretation is that unobserved factors influencing incompatibilities are not strongly correlated with omitted variables influencing militarization after conditioning on the observed factors.
Since existing Monte Carlo studies suggest that a Heckman selection model generally performs worse than a 2PM in the absence of selection, 53 we now turn to the 2PM approach for estimating the two-stage logit model. 53 Puhani 2000.
Model 5 has a specification identical to the Heckman Model 4, save for also including population in Stage 2. The results resemble previous estimates, unsurprisingly, given the limited evidence for selection (note that the coefficient of LDG in the logit 2PM model is larger). Both models produce clear evidence of the key measure of inequality being associated with incompatibilities but not with militarization. Figure 1 illustrates the differences in the substantive effects of LDG on the two stages. An increase from 0.2 to 0.6 in the population share of the largest discriminated group increases the likelihood of conflict origination by nearly one third (from 3.65% to 4.82%; middle panel). However, an equivalent increase in the size of the discriminated group has virtually no effect on the likelihood of conflict militarization (right panel). This non-monotonic effect on the two conflict stages is concealed in the dichotomous model (left panel). One might therefore (erroneously) conclude that LDG has an independent effect on violence.
[ Figure 1 ]
We tested the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative coding of the dependent variable.
The CONIAS violent crisis includes a number of small-scale conflicts outside the conventional definition of organized armed conflict. Therefore, we reran analyses by restricting the armed conflict category to the fourth and fifth CONIAS levels. As shown in Model 6, the estimates remain almost identical to the previous results. More importantly, to assess the validity of the CONIAS data, we also replaced CONIAS with non-violent and violent campaigns from the NAVCO dataset. 54 Although the NAVCO campaigns are conceptually and operationally quite different (i.e., restricted to events with minimum 1,000 participants), we find remarkably similar estimates (Model 7).
These results demonstrate the potential of the two-stage approach. While our aim here is not to present an elaborate theoretical interpretation of this specific finding, our estimates show that horizontal political inequalities increase the likelihood of incompatibilities but do not necessarily increase the likelihood of militarization as a specific response. We see this as having a clear value for advancing the theory on the inequality-conflict nexus, showing that the mechanism via which inequality influences civil conflict primarily relates to grievances and conflict origination rather than opportunities and conflict militarization.
Demonstrating the Value of a Two-Stage Approach through Further Replications
The section above presented and assessed the validity of data on the two stages, subsequently exploring the two-stage estimation procedure with population size as an instrument. We now proceed to a more formal application of the two-stage approach, assessing its wider applicability by replicating studies selected following more impartial criteria. holds true, then we should see refugees having a stronger effect on Stage 1.
Salehyan and Gleditsch find that the log of refugees from neighboring states significantly predicts outbreak of civil conflict, even when controlling for conflict in the neighborhood and trans-border ethnic kin. The fact that they only find a positive effect for refugees from neighboring countries suggests that refugees increase the risk of violence primarily in cases where incompatibilities already exist. Although couched more in terms of integration than incompatibilities, Bolfrass, Shaver, and Zhou emphasize that conditions in recipient countries (rather than characteristics of their place origin) determine whether refugees constitute a security risk.
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[ Table 3] 56 Bolfrass, Shaver, and Zhou 2015.
Model 8 in Table 3 This suggests that transnational shocks and ethnic ties primarily influence militarization when incompatibilities already exist. This, subsequently, supports the above-discussed Mechanism 1, indicating that refugees primarily affect civil conflict via the "import" of conflictspecific capital to existing incompatibilities and that refugees are unlikely to generate new incompatibilities with the host state, inconsistent with Mechanism 2.
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We now turn to the Warren study, investigating the relationship between state capacity and civil war onset. Unlike previous studies focusing on the role of "hard power" or coercive state capacity in deterring conflict, Warren argues that "soft power" and voluntary state compliance by citizens induced through political communication is a critical factor explaining 57 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Model 3 in Table 5. 58 See also Bolfrass, Shaver, and Zhou 2015; Bove and Böhmelt 2016. We may see increasing violence against refugees, but this is distinct from organized civil violence and may not involve the government.
(the absence of) civil war. Warren hypothesizes that the expansion of mass communication technologies (TV, radio, and newspapers) gives an edge to governments over the opposition in spreading normative influence and strengthening state loyalty among citizens. This produces barriers to mobilization for violence against a state. Warren demonstrates that his Media Density Index (MDI) reduces the likelihood of civil war onset "more than a tenfold", claiming that the "mass media infrastructure represents one of the most powerful forces for peace and stability yet observed in the modern world". [ Table 4 ]
Model 12 in Table 4 Table 1. has a smaller coefficient, likely due to Warren using Sambanis' civil war measure (with a high 1,000-death threshold). Replicating the model with more similar CONIAS 4-5 increases the coefficient for MDI (Model 14).
In the two-stage estimation, using the selection model (Model 15), we again find that population size only significantly affects Stage 1. However, the key measure, MDI, does not attain significance in both stages. Yet, consistent with previous replications, the model shows no significant selection, suggesting that the 2PM is more appropriate. Model 16 shows that the 2PM yields similar results, with population size and most other covariates having significant effects in the corresponding stages. Now, however, the coefficient for MDI attains significance at the 10% level (p = 0.077). This supports the above-discussed Mechanism 2, indicating that the pacifying effect of mass media exerts its influence via reduced likelihood of militarization rather than decreasing incompatibilities (inconsistent with Mechanism 1).
Figure 2 illustrates differences in the substantive effects of the key variables employed in the two replications, estimated following the two-stage approach. Following the dichotomous models (left panels), one might conclude that refugees and expanding mass media influence civil conflict via mechanisms relating to incompatibilities. The middle and right panels show why this might be incorrect, vindicating mechanisms that relate the two variables to civil conflict specifically via violence.
[ Figure 2 ]
In addition to the main results, we find notable patterns in the effects of other covariates.
Throughout all replications, we find that GDP per capita clearly has stronger effects on Stage 2 than Stage 1. This can be interpreted as support for the argument that poverty aids rebel recruitment, 62 as contrasted with the arguments that interpret the low GDP per capita-civil war relationship as reflecting that poverty generates incompatibilities. 63 We also find that the prominent curvilinear relationship between democracy and civil conflict is more evidenced in
Stage 1 (although this is more apparent in the replication of the Warren study).
Beyond the Domestic War and Peace Dichotomy
We have shown how a two-stage approach to civil conflict, highlighting conflict origination and militarization as separate stages, provides a useful alternative to binary conceptions of civil war.
Using new data on incompatibilities and violence, we have replicated three studies of civil conflict using the two-stage approach. These results provide new insights into the existing debates. In particular, our analysis has shown that the link between horizontal inequalities and civil conflict primarily reflects the effects on conflict origination and that grievances by themselves do not facilitate violence. Refugee flows can contribute to the spread of violence between neighboring countries but primarily facilitate conflict in countries with existing incompatibilities. 64 Finally, the effects of media density on decreasing violence apparently exert themselves through militarization. This calls for new research on the relative weight of how media density relates to alternative forms of non-violent mobilization versus norms against the use of violence per se. 62 Collier and Hoeffler 2013.
63 Buhaug et al. 2011. 64 This runs counter to some of the alarmist claims over the security implications of refugees in Altogether, we see these results as providing ample fodder for further theorizing and refining empirical results. Here, however, our primary aim is not to advance particular debates in specific studies but rather to show the overall potential of the two-stage approach, which can be applied to study any topic in research on civil war.
We believe our study underscores a number of other, general implications for conflict research. As demonstrated above, the reasons why conflicts start and why they militarize cannot simply be assumed to be the same. A two-stage approach may help account for this, allowing us to understand the relevant causes at different stages. Similarly, researchers must consider how features can have non-uniform effects on conflict origination and militarization. Sometimes, opposing effects may even average each other out in dichotomous models, leading to misplaced conclusions that no relationship exists. Careful attention to divergent effects on particular conflict stages can thus potentially explain inconsistencies in previous studies.
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Conflict researchers could also use the two-stage approach to assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables potentially influence civil conflict. While the two-stage approach cannot confirm or reject particular causal mechanisms, it may serve as a plausibility probe, providing clues as to more or less plausible alternatives. This, in turn, can lay the groundwork for subsequent in-depth research on actual causal mechanisms.
Finally, a two-stage framework can help inform data collection strategies, both with regards to identifying predictors of incompatibilities, and by limiting other efforts to collect data on attributes that can be observed for incompatibilities at the second-stage. Notes: The figure shows change in the probabilities (with 95th confidence intervals) of civil conflict onset, conflict origination, and conflict militarization as a function of refugees and Media Density Index. The estimates are based on Models 9 and 11 (Table 3) , and 14 and 16 (Table 4) 
